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Abstract. Why has the postwar march to independence stalled among small tropical 
islands? Why do dependent islands continue to vote for the status quo? The primary 
explanation in the literature is the substantial economic benefits conferred by political 
affiliation: preferential metropolitan trade, investment and migration opportunities and 
subsidized infrastructure funding. This study compares 16 dependent with 19 
independent islands in the Caribbean and Pacific across 25 socio-economic and 
demographic indicators. The former significantly out-perform their larger sovereign 
rivals across most indices. Results suggest the dependencies have more successfully 
restructured their colonial economies, have progressed further along the demographic 
transition, and comprise a new insular development case: the small service-driven 
dependent island economy. 
Introduction 
Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, over 80 former colonies have achieved 
independence. Many have been warm-water islands situated in all major oceanic basins. 
A sampling includes Jamaica and Barbados (Caribbean), Malta and Cyprus 
(Mediterranean), Seychelles and Maldives (Indian Ocean), and Fiji, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu (Pacific). However, the pace ofdecolonization has slowed considerably in 
recent decades. Since 1983 only four countries have been admitted to the UN as 
independent states: three former U.S. Trust Territories in the Pacific-Micronesia, 
Marshall Islands and Palau-and most recently (2002) East Timor (Timor Leste). 
Dozens of small, mostly island dependencies, with varying degrees of sub-sovereign 
jurisdiction, remain scattered across the globe content with the political status quo. This 
stalling of the independence juggernaut has prompted the UN to declare the 1990s as 
"The Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism," and to call for a repeat performance for 
2001-2010 (UN, 2000). What lies behind this insular propensity for dependence? 
Literature 
Despite the heterogeneity of these non-sovereign islands in size, history, geography and 
constitutional arrangements, there are some common political, cultural and economic 
reasons identified in the literature that apply in varying degrees across the spectrum. For 
example, in the metropoles after the first wave of independence during the postwar 
generation, the pressure to decolonize subsided. Several factors were responsible. First, 
in some cases metropolitan policy either neglected the territories because of more 
pressing matters or was inconsistent and/or lacked the flexibility for devising innovative 
solutions (Aldrich and Connell, 1997). Second, with the demise of the cold war, the 
dependent islands lost much of their strategic geopolitical value (Ramos and Rivera, 
200 I). Third, particularly since the escalation of global terrorist attacks, metropolitan 
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policy shifted away from status concerns toward enlisting the territories in the fight 
against drug traffic, money laundering and illegal migration (Lamp, 2001 ). Fourth, the 
metropolitan powers became increasingly willing "to respect the wishes of the 
electorate(s) ofthe dependent territories on constitutional matters" (Hintjens, 1997: 536), 
and islanders by and large have repeatedly opted to retain colonial ties. 
There are many reasons why the status quo is appealing to islanders. First has been the 
UN recognition that both free association with or integration into another sovereign state 
·'or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people" (UN, 
1970: 123) constitute, along with independence, legitimate avenues to self-determination 
(read decolonization). Second, many non-sovereign islands are sufficiently satisfied with 
the jurisdictional autonomy already achieved over local finance, taxation, natural 
resources and other matters (Baldacchino and Milne, 2000). Third, in some islands a 
generation of labor-intensive tourism growth and accelerating globalization has produced 
immigration pressures which have threatened "the definition and distinction of island 
identities" (Connell, 2001: 48). As a result, preserving local culture has become more 
prominent in political discourse than status concerns (Daniel, 2001). Other dependencies 
have had difficulty finding internal consensus on a way forward and/or squandered 
energy on domestic squabbles (Giacalone, 2001). 
However, the most important reason for continuing dependence is the widely held insular 
perception that going independent in a globalized world would damage the territories' 
substantial economic privileges. According to McElroy and Mahoney (2000: 32), these 
include: "free trade and export preferences for island produce and manufactures, access 
to lucrative metropolitan capital and labour markets, grants and welfare assistance, the 
subsidized provision of quality infrastructure, external defense and disaster relief." A 
host of additional advantages that apply variously include: (1) access to metropolitan 
citizenship, (2) minimum wage and health care center-periphery parity in the 
Francophone islands (Miles, 2001), (2) "flexible finance, environmental and commercial 
registration regulations" (Armstrong and Read, 2005: 11), and (4) the political stability 
and metropolitan oversight/security that generate widespread investor confidence. Many 
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of these benefits originally established to compensate for small insular size and 
geographic remoteness would be swept away by sovereignty. 
According to Rivera (2001: 161), "The perception that the economies of the non-
independent countries are more 'modem' and prosperous than those of most of the 
independent countries ... "is based on fact. A large stream of recent literature supports 
the claim. For example, Poirine (1998) found per capita income in non-sovereign islands 
double their sovereign counterparts primarily, he argues, because of their significantly 
higher levels of aid. Using a large 105 country sample of small countries (less than 3 
million population), Armstrong and Read (2000) found similar superior performance 
recorded for dependencies, 90 percent of which were islands. Other explanatory 
variables included differences in economic structure- services (tourism) and finance 
(offshore) in preference to agriculture- natural resource availability, and geographic 
location. McElroy and Mahoney (2000) described major socio-economic and 
demographic differences favoring dependencies in separate samples of Caribbean and 
Pacific islands. Finally, using a worldwide sample, Bertram (2004) advanced the 
argument that superior non-sovereign per capita income and growth were a direct 
function of the intensity of political dependence (and the assumed closeness of center-
periphery trade, aid and investment linkages) and the economic performance of the 
metropolitan patron. Given such strong evidence, he concluded (2004: 353): " .. . there is 
no clear incentive for presently dependent island territories to see independence, and 
good grounds for them to hold on to the status quo." 
Scope and Method 
The present study focuses on small, warm-water islands in the Caribbean and Pacific. Its 
purpose is twofold: ( 1) to empirically explore and define social, demographic as well as 
economic differences between non-sovereign islands and their sovereign counterparts, 
and (2) thus to provide a more comprehensive justification for the propensity for 
dependence. It extends an earlier analysis (McElroy and Mahoney, 2000) in three ways: 
(I) the exclusive focus on small islands less than 3 million population, (2) the use of 
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roughly double the number of independent variables, and (3) the use of statistical 
inference to test island differences. 
Thirty-five islands were selected based on the small size criterion and the availability of 
nearly complete published data. They comprised 16 dependent and 19 independent 
countries. From the Caribbean they included the following non-sovereign states: 
Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands (BVI), Cayman Islands, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Montserrat, Turks/Caicos, United States Virgin Islands (USVI) and 
Netherlands Antilles. This last is an aggregation of Bonaire, Curacao, St. Maarten, Saba 
and St. Eustatius. The sovereign Caribbean states were: Antigua/Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados. Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidadrrobago. In the Pacific, the dependents were American Samoa, 
French Polynesia, Guan1, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands, while the 
independents included: Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. These binary status classifications were based on 
UN definitions. While some studies (Bertram, 2004; McElroy and Mahoney, 2000) have 
treated the U.S. Associated States of Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau as non-
sovereign, according to Corbin (200 I: 139) they have achieved "sufficient sovereignty 
for acceptance as full members in the UN General Assembly ... " 
Twenty-five variables were selected to test for distinct socio-economic and demographic 
differences. To measure economic behavior and structure, ten variables were chosen. 
E ight were macroeconomic indicators: per capita income and electricity consumption. the 
unemployment and labor force participation rates, the distribution of GOP into 
agriculture, industry and services, and land area, a proxy for resource availability. 
Because of the significance of tourism in tropical islands, two tourism measures were 
used: the ratio of stayover tourists [excluding one-day (cruise passenger etc.) visitors] to 
the resident population, and per resident visitor expenditure. Four standard social/health 
indicators were employed: life expectancy, adult literacy, infant mortality and the number 
of phones per I ,000 population. Eleven demographic measures were used: population 
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size, growth and density; distribution into young (0-14 yrs.), working age (15-64 yrs.) 
and old (65+ yrs.) cohorts; median age, and birth, death, net migration and fertility rates. 
All variables except the tourism data were taken from the World Factbook (CIA, 2004). 
The tourism data came from the Compendium of Tourism Statistics (WTO, 2004). To 
develop distinct statistical profiles of the dependent versus the independent islands, 
average values were calculated for each group, and statistical differences were 
determined across the 25 variables using a two-sample means test. Given past island 
literature (Caldwell eta!., 1980; Dommen and Hein, 1985; Beller eta!., 1990) and the 
recent research reviewed above, it was hypothesized that, as a group, non-sovereign 
islands in comparison with their sovereign island neighbors would exhibit: ( l) higher 
levels of economic performance, (2) a stronger service orientation and tourism intensity, 
(3) and greater social progress in terms of higher life expectancy and literacy and lower 
infant mortality. Additionally it was assumed the more advanced dependents would 
demonstrate greater demographic maturity as evidenced by lower fertility, natality and 
population growth rates. 
Results 
Table I presents the basic data for the 35 islands. Table 2 displays average values for the 
two island groups classified by political status across the 25 indicators. It also presents 
results of the two-sample means test. These outcomes broadly suggest statistically 
distinct socio-economic and demographic profiles that basically conform to the 
differences hypothesized above. The non-sovereign countries differ markedly in size, 
structure and behavior from their sovereign counterparts. For example, in terms of basic 
resource availability, they average only a fourth and a third respectively of sovereign 
island land area and population. However, the lack of statistical difference tends to 
support the view of Armstrong and Read (2005) that size has no major influence on 
island behavior. 
On the other hand, the dependents' strong economic performance compensates for their 
relative resource scarcity. They average between 2-3 times higher levels of per capita 
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income, $16,381 versus $6,145, analogous to the findings ofPoirine (1998). Similarly 
dependents average 2-3 times higher levels of per capita electricity consumption, 4,246 to 
I ,537 kWh, a common proxy variable for income and a standard of living indicator. The 
labor force participation rate (LFPR), those employed and unemployed divided by the 
population, is a macroeconomic indicator of overall labor utilization. As expected, it is 
higher in the dependencies, 45 to 43 percent, but the difference is insignificant. 
Likewise, the average non-sovereign unemployment rate is lower, roughly II versus 14 
percent, but again the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, the labor variables 
do not discriminate between the profiles and may suggest the strength of other similar but 
undefined/measured economic forces operating across the insular spectrum. 
(Tables I and 2 about here) 
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Table 1: Basic Socio-Economic and Demographic Data 
Islands CBR CDR NMR IMR TFR LE Lit Income 
A Samoa 24.5 3.4 -20.7 9.5 3.4 75.6 97 8000 
Anguilla 14.5 5.5 10.8 21.9 1.7 76.9 95 8600 
Aruba 11.5 6.5 0 6 1.8 79 97 28000 
Bermuda 11.8 7.6 2.5 8.8 1.9 77.6 98 36000 
UK Virgins 15 4.4 10 18.1 1.7 76.3 98 16000 
Cayman Is. 13.1 4.8 18.8 8.4 1.9 79.8 98 35000 
F. Polynesia 17.3 4.6 2.9 8.6 2.1 75.7 98 18000 
Guadeloupe 15.8 6.1 -0.2 8.8 1.9 77.7 90 8000 
Guam 19.3 4.4 0 7.2 2.6 78.1 99 21000 
Martinique 14.6 6.4 -0.1 7.3 1.8 78.9 98 14400 
Montserrat 17.6 7.4 0 7.6 1.8 78.5 97 3400 
N. Antilles(4) 15.4 6.4 -0.4 10.4 2 75.6 97 11400 
N Caledonia 19 5.6 0 7.9 2.4 73.8 91 15000 
N. Marianas 19.8 2.3 9.6 7.3 1.3 75.7 97 12500 
Turks!Caicos 22.9 4.3 11 .7 16.3 3.1 74.3 98 9600 
US Virgins 14.5 6.1 -8.9 8.2 2.2 78.8 96 17200 
Antigua/Barbuda 17.7 5.6 -6.2 20.2 2.3 71.6 89 11000 
Bahamas 18.2 8.8 -2.2 25.7 2.2 65.6 96 16700 
Barbados 13 9.1 -0.3 12.6 1.7 71 6 97 15700 
Dommtca 16.3 6.9 -13.9 14.8 2 74.4 94 5400 
Fl}t 22.9 5.7 -3.1 13 2.8 69.2 94 5800 
Grenada 22.6 7.3 -13.9 14.6 2.4 64.5 98 5000 
Jamaica 16.9 5.4 -4.9 12.8 2 76.1 88 3900 
Ktribati 31 8.5 0 49.9 4.2 61.3 N/A 850 
Marshal/Is. 33.9 4.9 -6 30.5 4 69.7 94 1600 
Micronesia 25.8 5 -20 31.3 3.4 69.4 89 2000 
Palau 18.7 6.9 2.8 15.3 2.5 73.2 92 9000 
St. Kitts/Nevis 18.3 8.7 -7.1 14.9 2.4 71.9 97 8800 
St. Lucia 20.5 5.2 -2.7 14 2.3 73.3 67 5400 
St. Vincent 16.8 6 -7.6 15.2 1.9 73.4 96 3000 
Samoa 15.7 6.5 -11 .7 28.7 3.1 70.4 99 5600 
Solomon Is. 31.6 4 0 22.1 4.2 72.4 N/A 2000 
Tonga 24.9 5.5 0 13 3 69.2 98 2500 
Trinidad/Tobago 12.8 9 -10.8 24.6 1.8 69.3 99 9500 
Vanuatu 23.7 8 0 56.6 2.9 62.1 53 3000 
Sources. All data most recent from World Factbook (CIA, 2004) except the two tourism indicators. from 
Com1:1endium of Tourism Statistics (WTO, 2004). 
Notes· 1. GOP shares for Aruba, N. Marianas, Turks/Caicos and Palau are authors' estimates 
2. 
based on labor force shares and/or regional patterns. 
some LFPRates are authors' estimates based on LF projections from earlier years 
3. The ratio of tourists to resident population includes only stayover visitors. 
4. The two tourism indicators for N. Antilles exclude Saba and St. Eustatius. 
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Table 1: Basic Socio-Economic and Demographic Data 
Islands %Ag{1) %1nd(1) %Ser{1) LFPR(2) UN Elec/Po~ Phones Vis$/Po~ Vs/Po~(3) 
A Samoa 10 25 65 30 6 2090 259 449 0.9 
Angwlla 4 18 78 47 6.7 3277 477 4230 8.54 
Aruba 1 15 84 58 0.6 6948 512 12612 9 03 
Bermuda 1 10 89 58 5 9209 861 5830 4.37 
UK Virgins 2 6 92 54 3 1596 527 15405 12.84 
Cayman Is. 1 3 95 46 4.1 8241 882 14048 7.03 
F. Polynesia 6 18 76 34 12 1496 197 1329 0.71 
Guadeloupe 15 17 68 31 27 2416 472 1012 1.17 
Guam 7 15 78 45 15 4647 506 12041 7.22 
Martinique 6 11 83 41 27 2491 419 552 1.04 
Montserrat 5 14 81 48 6 251 400 865 1.08 
N. Antilles(4) 1 15 84 43 15.6 4663 385 3237 2.89 
N. Caledonia 5 30 65 44 19 7300 253 468 0.49 
N. Marianas 5 20 75 53 8 N/A 294 9760 6 
Turks/Caicos 5 10 85 50 10 254 302 14600 7.85 
US Virgins 19 80 45 9.3 8804 638 11397 5.08 
Antigua/Barbuda 4 19 77 44 11 1433 556 3982 3.25 
Bahamas 3 7 90 55 6.9 4842 439 5879 5.05 
Barbados 6 16 78 47 10.7 2607 485 2328 1.79 
Dominica 18 24 58 39 20 972 346 650 1 
Fiji 17 22 61 30 8 1721 116 296 0.45 
Grenada 8 24 68 47 13 1435 380 940 1.48 
Jamaica 7 37 56 42 15.9 2150 164 446 0.47 
Kiribati 30 7 63 30 15 65 50 40 0.06 
Marshal/Is. 14 16 70 50 30 N/A 78 69 0.1 
Micronesia 50 4 46 N/A 16 N/A 97 148 0.18 
Palau 10 15 75 50 2.3 N/A 350 2950 2.95 
St. Kitts/Nevis 4 26 70 47 4.5 2404 606 1469 1.75 
St. Lucia 7 20 73 30 16.5 681 317 1328 1.54 
St. Vincent 10 26 64 51 22 734 235 691 0.67 
Samoa 14 23 63 51 N/A 552 68 253 0.5 
Solomon Is. 42 11 47 30 N/A 60 13 12 0.04 
Tonga 26 12 62 35 13.3 230 109 408 0.34 
Trinidad/Tobago 3 49 48 54 10.4 4508 301 204 0.35 
Vanuatu 26 12 62 NIA NIA 200 35 222 0.24 
Sources: All data most recent from World Factbook (CIA, 2004) except the two tourism indicators, 
from Com!;1endium ofTourism Statistics (WTO, 2004). 
Notes: 1. GDP shares for Aruba, N. Marianas, Turks/Caicos and Palau are authors' esttmates 
based on labor force shares and/or regional patterns. 
2. Some LFPRates are authors' estimates based on LF projections from earlier years. 
3. The ratio of tourists to resident population includes only stayover visitors. 
4. The two tourism indicators for N. Antilles exclude Saba and St. Eustatius. 
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a e T bl 2 D ependent versus Independent Island Profiles 
Variables 
Area 
Population 
0-14 
15-64 
65+ 
Median Age 
Growth 
Density 
Crude Birth Rate 
Crude Death Rate 
Net Migration Rate 
Infant Mortality Rate 
Total Fertility Rate 
Life Expectancy 
Literacy Rate 
Income 
% Agriculture 
% Industrial 
%Services 
LFPR 
Unemployment 
Electricity/ Pop 
Phones 
Visitor Spending/Pop 
Tourism/ Pop 
* Stgmficant to .1 0 level 
** Significant to .05 level 
***Significant to .025 level 
****Significant to .OOllevel 
De[!endent Inde[!endent T- Values 
Islands Islands 
1871 7582 - 1.76* 
139 375 -1.57 
25. 13 31.05 -3.17*** 
67.56 63.58 2.67*** 
7.37 5.21 2.45*** 
31.04 25.26 3. 74** ** 
1.356 0.872 1.48 
261 173 1.12 
16.66 21.12 -2.65* ** 
5.36 6.68 -2.57*** 
2.25 -5.66 2.97*** 
10.14 22.60 -4.03**** 
2.100 2.689 -2.61 *** 
77.02 69.93 6.89**** 
96.50 90.60 1.94* 
16381 6145 3.94**** 
4.69 15.70 -3.42* ** 
15.38 19.50 -1.37 
79.88 64.80 4.43**** 
45.44 43.06 0.78 
10.89 13.47 -0.98 
4246 1537 3.05*** 
462 250 3.22*** 
6740 1174 3.68*** 
4.77 1.17 3.63*** 
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It is a different story with economic structure. The dependent islands average a much 
lower ratio of primary production and a much higher ratio of tertiary output. For 
exan1ple, in non-sovereign countries agriculture accounts for less than 5 percent of GOP 
while it generates nearly 16 percent in sovereign countries. On the other hand, services 
absorb approximately 80 percent of GOP in dependents in contrast to 65 percent in 
independents. These statistically significant differences suggest the former have 
progressed further than the latter in restructuring their colonial economies away from 
traditional low value-added staples like sugar and copra toward more income-elastic 
tourism and offshore finance. These results parallel the findings of Armstrong and Read 
(2000) but go a step further and specifically point toward the important economic impact 
of tourism in the dependent islands. To illustrate, tourists spend an average of nearly 6 
times more per resident in the non-sovereign as in the sovereign islands, i.e. $6,740 
versus $1,174. In addition, the ratio of tourists (stayovcr visitors) to resident population 
is four times higher in the dependencies than in their independent counterparts. In short, 
the island territories are considerably more tourism penetrated. 
Such evidence indirectly indicates that- in addition to tropical amenities and favorable 
location-non-sovereign islands have more effectively implemented an endogenous 
policy of tourism development. They have thereby hitched their fortunes to the fastest 
growing industry in the postwar world and the largest in the global economy. McElroy 
and Morris (2002) identified similar differences in tourism intensity to explain part of the 
superior performance of African islands against their mainland counterparts. The results 
also underline Bertram' s (2004) thesis on the significance of metropolitan linkages since 
it is demand in the main tourist origin markets in North America, Europe and Japan that 
fuels tourism growth in the Caribbean and Pacific peripheries. Finally, these results 
support McElroy's (2005) contention that small, tourism-driven, dependent islands 
represent a special development case distinct from the widely discussed MIRAB model 
(migration, remittances, aid, bureaucracy)(Bertram and Watters, 1985). This conclusion 
is based in part on the subsidized transport and communications infrastructure and 
metropolitan ease of travel (common language, currency, customs) facilitated by their 
affiliated political status. 
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Social variables also discriminate the two island profiles. Given their higher affluence 
and the income elasticity of medical services, the dependents average significantly higher 
life expectancy (77 yrs.) than their independent counterparts (70 yrs.). Likewise and 
partly stemming from their higher population densities and assumed greater health care 
access, the non-sovereigns experience significantly lower infant mortality, i.e. I 0 deaths 
per I ,000 live births versus 23 for the poorer sovereign countries. The wealthier 
dependents also exhibit higher average adult literacy rates than the independents, 97 to 91 
percent, although the difference lies only at the I 0 percent level of statistical significance. 
Taken together, all such evidence indirectly suggests the closer metropolitan ties of the 
dependencies may foster access to superior health care and education in the 
dependencies. 
Not surprisingly, Table 2 also displays different demographic profiles. For example, the 
dependencies clearly have an older age structure with a significantly smaller share of 
youth (0-14 yrs.), 25 versus 31 percent, and significantly larger shares of working age 
(15-64 yrs.) and old (65+ yrs.) cohorts, respectively, 68 and 64 percent and 7.4 and 5.2 
percent. Because of their stronger economies and levels of affluence, they possess 
somewhat larger labor forces and retiree segments. As a result, median age in the non-
sovereign islands (31 yrs.) is roughly 6 years older than in sovereign islands (25 yrs.). 
The dependents also exhibit greater progress along the demographic transition from high 
to low birth and death rates that all modernizing societies pass through. To illustrate, the 
non-sovereign islands average significantly lower crude birth rates, 17 versus 21 per 
1 ,000 population for the independents. This is partly a function of their relative 
affluence. Likewise, their total fertility rate averages significantly fewer children (2.1 vs. 
2.7) per women of child-bearing age. Such behavior is a function of their greater socio-
economic modernization, better health care and lower infant mortality. They also exhibit 
significantly lower crude death rates, 5.4 versus 6.7 per 1,000 population, partly due to 
their older age structure and perhaps also associated with their 50 percent higher 
population density (261 vs. 173 persons!krn2). Density in small islands is a surrogate 
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indicator of greater urbanization and medical access (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 
1995). 
Finally, the dependents demonstrate a lower average rate of natural increase (birth minus 
death rates) but a higher population growth rate than their sovereign counterparts. This 
derives principally from their very different net migration rates. On the one hand, the 
non-sovereign islands average an immigration rate of2.25 persons per I ,000 population. 
This inflow most likely of working age migrants is due to their expanding economies 
based on tourism, related construction and offshore finance, all relatively labor-intensive 
industries. As a result, such islands have passed through the so-called migration 
transition (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 1988) whereby former labor exporters become 
labor importers. On the other hand, the sovereign islands as a group show an average 
emigration rate of -5.66 persons per I ,000 population, largely a function of their 
relatively slower-growing economies and chronic labor surplus. This demographic 
characteristic of out-migration is perhaps the most telling indicator that discriminates the 
independents from their more affluent and dynamic dependent neighbors. 
Conclusions 
One of the anomalies of the postwar world has been the visible slowdown in the 
movement toward independence, particularly among small island polities. Although off-
hand explanations for this propensity for dependence might suggest political inertia 
and/or the fear of marginalization in a globalized economy, closer inspection reveals 
deeper and more complex determinants. The overwhelming conclusion of this study is 
that such non-sovereign states have become increasingly cognizant of the substantial 
socio-economic benefits associated with affiliation, have exercised and expanded their 
resource of jurisdiction to exploit those advantages, and have successfully carved out a 
niche in the world system as tourism and offshore finance service providers for 
metropolitan clients. 
The economic linkages afforded by dependent status are significant. They include: 
preferential trade, migration and citizenship arrangements, access to metropolitan capital 
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markets and specialized labor expertise, the subsidized provision of key transport and 
communications infrastructure essential for the success of the two primary engines of 
insular economic growth-tourism and offshore finance-plus a host of other industry 
specific concessions and common customs and standards that facilitate commerce. 
Because of these visible, concrete, day-to-day benefits, over the past 15 years small-state 
islanders have repeatedly voted to hold on to the status quo. 
A recent stream of island research has confirmed the scientific basis for their persistent 
choice to retain metropolitan linkages and the favorable benefits of the political economy 
of dependence. A variety of authors have found non-sovereign islands significantly 
superior in income levels and economic growth compared to their sovereign neighbors. 
They have also identified the sources of their superiority tied in general to metropolitan 
economic linkages, and in particular to higher levels of aid and a policy orientation 
toward services and finance to capture the forces of sustained international tourism 
growth and the ubiquity of global capital movements. 
This study empirically extends that research by detailing the socio-economic and 
demographic profiles of 25 tropical islands in the Caribbean and Pacific: 16 dependents 
and 19 independents. Despite the small sub-samples, the analysis constructs statistically 
distinct contours that clearly favor the dependent islands. In addition to their higher 
levels of per capita income and electricity consumption, islanders in the non-sovereign 
states live longer, are more literate and experience much lower infant mortality and health 
care. Because of their relative affluence, not surprisingly they demonstrate greater 
demographic maturity in terms of lower fertility and mortality. According to McElroy 
and de Albuquerque ( 1995: 176), their achievement "is all the more remarkable given the 
fact that a generation ago the performance indicators were decidedly reversed in favor of 
the larger soon-to-be sovereign islands." 
In summary, in contrast to the independent islands, the dependents have more 
successfully restructured their economies from income-inelastic colonial staples to 
income-elastic services, have progressed further along the demographic transition from 
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high to low birth and death rates, and in the process passed through the migration 
transition from chronic labor exporting emigrant societies to dynamic, labor-importing 
immigrant societies. On the heels of these momentous socio-economic and demographic 
changes, they have come to represent a new, successful, insular development case- the 
small, service-driven dependent island economy. For these reasons, their propensity for 
dependence persists. 
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